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COURT OF APPEALS. 1955 TERM
Coram Nobis-Presumption of Regularify
A writ of error coram nobis will be granted upon a showing that a conviction
was obtained by fraud, misrepresentation, coercion or in any situation where a
defendant has been convicted without a preservation of his constitutional rights
defendant has been convinced without a preservation of his constitutional rights
75
and this does not appear upon the record.
People v. Boeh' 76 involved a motion for such a writ upon the grounds that
petitioners had been convicted without notification of their right to counsel.
There seems to be no question but that such notification was given; however
petitioners based their motion upon the claim that at the time of the trial they
had been unable to understand the English language and had been generally
uneducated. There was evidence that petitioners, at the time of the trial, had had
mental capacities equivalent to that of a five year old child.
The Court held, affirming the Appellate Division,77 that petitioners had not
sufficiently overcome the presumption of regularity which attaches to a judicial
proceeding" s and that therefore the motion should have been denied.
Failure to inform a person of his right to counsel is of course a denial of a
constitutional right 79 and therefore a basis for coram nobis. However, in the
absence of a showing otherwise, there is always a presumption that a judicial
proceeding was without error.8 0 The question therefore becomes whether the
petitioners presented sufficient proof to overcome this presumption. The Court
felt it was reasonable to presume that if petitioners had sufficient knowledge to
carry out a crime they had sufficient intelligence to realize why they were in court
and what their basic rights were. The fact that no interpreter was deemed necessary is an indication that petitioners were sufficiently versed in the English language
to grasp the significance of their right to counsel.
Since a court will not base its decision upon issues which were not raised in
the court below, 81 the Court was correct in refusing to consider the report of
petitioners' mental incapacity. It may be noted that the Court did not preclude
another motion upon these grounds.
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The dissent took the view that the evidence of petitioners' mental incapacity
should have been considered in that it was uncontradicted and a matter of record.
The dissent effectively pointed out that there is very much doubt as to whether
petitioners' conviction should be upheld but has ignored the fact that mental
incapacity was not properly in issue here. The dismissal of the writ without
prejudice has saved this from being a hard decision.

